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Abstract
This paper investigates the Asian real estate price run-up and collapse in the 1990s. We identify
financial intermediaries’ underpricing of the put option imbedded in non-recourse mortgage loans as
a potential cause for the observed price behavior. This underpricing is due to behavioral causes
(lender optimism and disaster myopia) and/or rational response of lenders to market incentives
(agency conflicts, deposit insurance, or limited liability of bank shareholders). The empirical
evidence suggests that underpricing occurred in Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia. Consequently,
these countries experienced a more severe market crash than Hong Kong and Singapore, where
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underpricing was kept under control by strong government intervention and/or more appropriate
incentive mechanisms.
# 2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Excessive bank lending to the real estate sector has been noted as an explanation of the
Asian financial crisis. For instance, while Sachs and Woo (2000) point to macroeconomic
problems as the basis for the crisis, they also note that ‘‘too much money was poured into
speculative real estate projects, e.g., in downtown Bangkok.’’ More directly, Krugman
(1998), states that ‘‘(t)he problem began with financial intermediaries—institutions whose
liabilities were perceived as having an implicit government guarantee, but were essentially
unregulated and therefore subject to severe moral hazard problems. The excessive risky
lending of these institutions created inflation—not of goods but of asset prices.’’ Krugman
goes on to identify the need for a more complex analysis of the Asian financial crisis based
on an option value approach.
In a recent theoretical paper Pavlov and Wachter (2004), hereafter PW, formalize an
options-based model of financial intermediaries. As PW show, non-recourse asset-backed
loans imbed a put option which gives the borrower the right to default. If the value of the
underlying asset falls below the outstanding balance of the loan, the borrower may simply
‘‘put’’ the asset to the lender, and walk away from any future payments of the principal or
interest on the loan. The lender is compensated for providing this option through a higher
interest rate on the loan. PW demonstrate that, if lenders underprice this put option, asset
markets incorporate this mistake in higher asset prices. They further identify the conditions
that induce lenders to rationally underprice the put option.
In this paper, we apply the PW model to the Asian financial crisis. In particular, we
examine the underpricing hypothesis for its impact on asset prices, using data for five Asian
countries. This underpricing is initiated by short-term bank managers who rationally
underestimate the default risk of their loans in order to capture larger market share. Under
certain conditions, competition then forces all remaining managers to underprice the put
option as well. PW show such these effects can lead to an underpricing equilibrium in the
lending market, as well as inflated prices in the asset market. Importantly, these results hold
even when market participants are fully rational.
Of the five Asian countries we examine, we empirically find evidence consistent with
the PW underpricing phenomena in Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia. Hong Kong and
Singapore, on the other hand, do not seem to exhibit the symptoms of underpricing.
Interestingly, the first three countries experienced real estate price declines of 95, 86, and
81 percentage points, respectively, while Singapore and Hong Kong saw relatively more
tempered declines of 33 and 38 percentage points. These findings are consistent with the
widely accepted notion that there was a shift in demand for real estate assets caused by
macroeconomic negative demand shock but this shift was substantially magnified by the
excessive bank lending in certain countries.
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A large body of literature has examined the role of the banking sector in propagating
business cycles; see, for example Bernanke (1983), Bernanke and Gertler (1995), Kiyotaki
and Moore (1997), and Allen and Gale (1997). These studies demonstrated that the
workings of the financial sector can amplify the magnitude of the business cycle as bank
credit exposure moves procyclically. In the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis, many
researchers, including Krugman (1998), Wade (1998), Mera and Renaud (2000), Tan
(2000) and Quigley (2001), have examined the role played by the real estate sector in the
crisis, and have argued for reforms in the regulation of the real estate markets and the
treatment of real estate loans by financial institutions in order to prevent the recurrence of
the kind of asset bubbles that contributed to the financial crisis.
Commentators have noted that real estate markets are vulnerable to waves of optimism
and herd behavior that result in bubbles;6 and that speculation in real-estate markets was
rampant in many Southeast Asian economies in the early 1990s (Quigley, 2001). In
Thailand, for instance, short-term capital inflows found its way into Thailand’s real estate
market, as banks competed to lend to real estate developers and investors, based on
expectations of continued strong economic growth (Tan, 2000). Herring and Wachter
(1999) find that a common striking feature of many financial crises around the world is that
the most seriously affected economies often first experienced a collapse in real estate prices
and a consequent weakening of banking systems before going on to experience an
exchange rate crisis, a banking sector crisis, and a business cycle bust. We add to this
literature by identifying the conditions that would accompany a bank-driven financial crisis
and examine whether this analysis applies to the Asian financial crisis.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we briefly review key developments in
Asian real estate markets in the early 1990s, focusing on the surge in foreign capital and the
expansion of bank credit to the real estate sector. In Section 3, we discuss the relationship
between lender optimism and underpricing of the put option in non-recourse loans, as
described in PW. We also discuss the role that market optimism plays in the real estate
markets across Asian economies. Section 4 applies the analysis of PW to investigate bank
loan underpricing as a factor in real estate markets in Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia,
Singapore and Thailand and the Asian financial crisis. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2. Asian economic growth and real estate bubble
With the benefit of hindsight, it is clear that the activities in real estate markets in
emerging Asian economies7 in the early to mid-1990s were an important contributing
factor to the Asian financial crisis of 1997. As early as 1996, the risk that the real estate
sector posed to the overall stability of the financial sector was noted by the IMF.8 As we
will see a large portion of the banking credit was extended to the real estate sector.9
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6 See Mera and Renaud (2000) and Quigley (2001), which provide detailed accounts of the role played by
Asia’s real estate market in the financial crises of 1997–1998.
7 In this paper, emerging Asian economies include China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines,
Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan and Thailand.
8 World Economic Outlook, December 1997, p. 69, Box 1.
9 See Edison, Luangaram, and Miller (2000) and Tan (2000) for further discussion on the subject.
Nonetheless, the origins of the Asian real estate bubble can be traced to the surge in capital
inflows into East Asia in the early 1990s, when emerging Asian economies are
experiencing strong economic growth.
Many Asian currencies were then managed against a basket of currencies, of which,
both directly and indirectly, the U.S. dollar is the most significant component, accounting
for over 70% of the weightage. Following the 1985 Plaza Accord, which effectively
devalued the U.S. dollar by close to 50% against the yen, the export competitiveness of
many Asian economies was boosted in the late 1980s.
As foreign capital surged into Asia, speculation in the real estate market, driven by
cheap financing, was rampant. In many countries, loan quantum and credit facilities of up
to 90% of the collateral value were common for investments in real estate properties (Mera
& Renaud, 2000). This flood of liquidity led to a sharp price appreciation in the asset
markets, inflated collateral value and prompted further credit expansion as asset prices
climbed.
Banks competed by increasing loan amounts, reducing interest rates for certain
customers, and even extending renovation loans. By 1996, the loan exposure of the real
estate sector in Thailand was estimated at 30–40% of total loans with a value of US$160
billion. While the buildup in real estate exposure was dramatic in Thailand, other countries
also saw a significant buildup. From 1992 to 1996 more than 70% of bank lending in
Malaysia was channeled into real estate and stock-market investments. In South Korea too,
Korean conglomerates invested a substantial amount of real estate, mostly financed with
short-term debt (Mera & Renaud, 2000). Barth et al. (1998) estimate that expansion in bank
credit to the private sector, relative to GDP growth, was 48% in Hong Kong during the
1990–1996 period; the corresponding figures were 62% in Indonesia, 40% in Malaysia,
115% in the Philippines, and 70% in Thailand. By comparison, the growth was 19% in
Germany, 3% in Japan, 16% in the United Kingdom, and 21.5% in the United States. The
rapid expansion in bank credit to the real estate sector continued in 1995 and 1996 even as
the ratio of nonperforming real estate loans to total loans rose. As shown in Table 1, in
1995, nonperforming loans were 10.4% of all bank loans in Indonesia, 7.7% in Thailand,
and almost 6% in Malaysia.
The real estate boom in Asia mirrored the fortunes of Asian stock market.10 As shown in
Fig. 1A–E for Thailand, Indonesia, Singapore, Hong Kong and Malaysia, respectively, the
real estate markets and the stock markets tracked closely in both the ascent and the
subsequent collapse.
Asia’s real estate bubble started to deflate in early 1996, as U.S. interest rates started to
rise. This prompted the appreciation of the U.S. dollar against the yen, and eroded the
export competitiveness of Asian economies, as Asian currencies were tied to the U.S.
dollar. As current account balances of Asian economies deteriorated, this led to a depletion
of foreign exchange reserves, and raised investor concerns over the sustainability of the
pegged currency regimes. As Krugman (1998) notes ‘‘in all the afflicted countries there
was a boom-bust cycle in the asset markets that preceded (author’s italics) the currency
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most likely that both herding and excessive bank lending occurred mutually reinforcing the asset bubble.
However, the share of real estate funded by banks increased as the bubble emerged. (Herring & Wachter, 1999).
crisis: stock and land prices soared, then plunged (although after the crisis they plunged
even more).’’ The commercial real estate markets fell sharply across Asian cities during
1997–1998. Property prices plunged by an average of 40%. Similar declines were recorded
for the residential real estate property markets (Asian Financial markets: 4th Quarter, 1998,
published by J.P. Morgan).
3. A model of investor optimism and bank lending
Expectations play an important part in the formation and collapse of real estate bubbles.
An asset bubble occurs when investors believe that future investments will continue to
yield high returns, despite worsening fundamentals. A strong growing economy, as was the
case in Asia during the early 1990s, raises expectations about future prospects and
increases the willingness of banks to increase their credit exposure (see Mera & Renaud,
2000; Quigley, 2001; Tan, 2000).
In a booming economy, borrowers and lenders thus have an incentive to provide as high
an estimate as possible of the collateral value of assets. For the borrower, it is to maximize
the quantum of loan facility; while for the lender, it is to compete for a bigger slice of the
loanable funds market. Herring and Wachter (1999, 2002) point to a common reliance on
external appraisals in the real estate markets, which enables this outcome. Such appraisals
are usually based on recent transactions and, as such, are backward-looking.11
In Asia’s real estate market in the early 1990s, the incentive problems inherent in asset
appraisal and valuation have been noted. Previous studies, surveyed in Mera and Renaud
(2000), identified a number of such problems in Asia’s banking sector that contributed to
the buildup of the real estate bubble. These features included unsophisticated credit risk
management system, the implicit support of financial institutions by the government, and
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Table 1










as % of GNP
Non-performing
real estate loans






China 35–40 930 9 n.a. D 812
Hong Kong 40–55 300 76 3.0 C 154
Indonesia 25–30 54 7 18.0 – 197
Malaysia 30–40 120 58 6.0 D+ 94
Philippines 15–25 40 17 8.0 D+ 87
Singapore 30–40 130 30 4.5 C+ 94
South Korea 15–25 440 17 18.0 D 480
Taiwan 35–45 400 58 5.0 D 274
Thailand 30–40 160 44 16.0 E+ 176
a Estimates, based on Asian Financial Markets, 2nd Quarter 1998, J.P. Morgan Inc.
11 Hendershott and Kane (1995) present econometric evidence of such appraisal bias of over 50% in the late
1980s U.S. commercial office market.
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Fig. 1. Stock market capitalization and real estate property index: (A) Thailand, (B) Indonesia, (C) Singapore, (D)
Hong Kong, and (E) Malaysia.
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relatively lax regulation that enabled banks to lend at high loan-to-collateral values. Many
Asian financial markets were also characterized by weak foreclosure and property rights
laws, as well as a lack of transparency of lending relationships. Close linkages and
reciprocal business relationships in Asian economies also made it easy to mortgage real
estate assets at inflated assessed values in order to secure funding for new business ventures
or to expand existing businesses (Bullard, Bello, & Malhotra, 1998). In the aftermath of the
Asian Financial Crisis, IMF’s Stanley Fischer noted that among the key domestic factors
leading to the East Asian crisis was ‘‘. . . lax prudential rules and financial oversight which
led to a sharp deterioration in the quality of banks’ loan portfolios’’ (Fischer, 1998, p. 21).
PW offer a theoretical model that shows how the presence of short-term players in the
banking sector induces the underpricing of the put option of non-recourse loans. Here, we
briefly describe Pavlov and Wachter’s underpricing model. In the model, banks are defined
as financial intermediaries that accept deposits and make loans to borrowers and investors
who purchase the risky real estate with zero equity. All agents are risk-neutral. The
fundamental price of the risky real estate asset is the expected discounted value of the asset
over all possible future states of the economy. A rational investor would pay this price in the
absence of lending or if lending is full recourse. For simplicity, a two-state model is
analysed in which the asset has high payoff (RH), or low payoff (RL). Let the probability of
the high-payoff state be d. The fundamental asset price, denoted Pf, is
Pf ¼ RH þ ð1  dÞRL
1 þ d (1)
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where d is the discount rate, which is also the deposit rate that the bank offers. In the case of
non-recourse lending, an investor who purchases the asset with zero equity either receives
the payoff RH in the good state less the interest payments, or receives zero in the bad state.
Let the lending rate be denoted by i. If the put option imbedded in the non-recourse loan is
fairly priced, the expected payoff of the investor is zero in either state, so that
RH  Pð1 þ iÞ ¼ 0 (2)
where P denotes the current price of the asset. Let v denotes the value of the put option,
which satisfies the non-arbitrage condition: v + (1  d)[(RL/P)1] = 0. This yields




In other words, the value of the put option is equal to the magnitude of the expected loss if the
low-payoffstateoccurs.Sinceinterestpaymentsarecollectedonlyinthehigh-payoffstate, this
means that the interest rate on the loan, i, must incorporate the value of the put option that is
given to the borrower. Specifically, the appropriate loan rate must satisfy the following
relationship: di = v + d. Substitute the fair value of v derived earlier in (3) to obtain
i ¼ 1
d






Substituting into (2), we obtain P = [RH + (1  d)RL]/1 + d, i.e., the current price which is
equal to the fundamental price. However, if the value of the put option is underpriced, so
that instead of v, it is v ¼ v  e. In this case, it is straightforward to show that
P = [(RH + (1  d)RL)/(1 + d  e)] > Pf. Thus, any underpricing of the put option
imbedded in the loan results in an inflated asset price.
PW show that the presence of short-term players such as bank officers and their
managers gives rise to private incentives for the default risks of real estate loans to be
underpriced. In a booming market, loan officers may compete to meet their quota of
loans—particularly, if their compensation is tied to their degree of success in generating
new real estate loans. Such incentives are strengthened in the presence of informational
asymmetries, when it is not possible to accurately monitor if the real estate loans are priced
properly. In such situations, any underpricing is detected only when real estate loans
actually default and become non-performing. If no default occurs, bank officers and those
involved in making the loans receive their salaries and the managers receive their bonuses,
which are an increasing function of the realized profits.
The market implication of the PW model is that when lending rates are lower than they
should be and do not incorporate the value of the put option asset prices will exceed their
fundamental level. A further implication of the PW model is that banks will compete for
additional demand deposits to generate new loans. This competition drives up the bank
deposit rates during a real estate bubble. Putting the two predictions of the Pavlov–Wachter
model together, this implies that in an environment of lender optimism, we are likely to see
a narrowing of the differential between the bank lending rate and deposit rate. The
predictions are summarized in Result 3 of Pavlov and Wachter’s model:
Result 3 of Pavlov and Wachter (2004). The underpricing equilibrium results in inflated
asset prices above their fundamental level. The two forces driving the divergence between
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market and fundamental prices are: (a) Lower lending rates that do not reflect the
value of the put option; (b) Higher deposit rates due to the banks’ increased demand
for deposits.
The divergence between market value and fundamental value of real estate assets in an
underpricing equilibrium is not directly testable. However, if the Pavlov–Wachter model
holds, the differential of the lending rate over the deposit rate can be used as a proxy for the
extent of underpricing of the default risk.
As periods of widespread underpricing are often associated with increased lending
activity, this leads to a second testable implication that deposit rates are positively
correlated with asset prices. This is because banks must attract additional funds, and
competition drives up the deposit rates. Therefore, we test for the occurrence of an
underpricing equilibrium in the real estate market with the following hypothesis:
Result 4 of Pavlov and Wachter (2004). The spread between lending rates and deposit
rates is negatively correlated with asset prices. Deposit rates are positively correlated with
asset prices.
4. Testing for lender optimism in Asian real estate markets
To apply the model, we first construct real estate price indices – for Thailand, Singapore,
Malaysia, Indonesia and Hong Kong – using data from various sources, including The
World Bank’s World Development Indicators (2002), Bloomberg and the central banks of
the countries in this study. The data on interest rates are obtained from the websites of the
various central banks. The relationship between the property price index and the interest
rate differentials for Thailand other Asian economies are illustrated in Fig. 2A–E.
Table 2 reports the results of the correlation analysis to test if the Pavlov and Wachter
(2004) model are supported in Asian real estate markets. The correlation analysis, for the
period 1993 to 1997, is based on the levels in the property price index and interest rate
differential. To determine the significance of these results, we construct confidence
intervals for the correlation coefficients, as follows. Let r denotes the correlation
coefficient, n denotes the number of observations, and S:D: ¼
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
ð1  r2Þ=ðn  2Þ
p
denotes
the standard deviation. The confidence interval, at 5% significance level, is given by
(r  1.96  S.D., r + 1.96  S.D.).
In the case of Thailand, the correlation coefficients, reported in Table 2, are of the right
signs, consistent with the predictions of the Pavlov–Wachter model. Changes in real estate
price index were positively correlated with changes in 3-month deposit rates and negatively
correlated with the changes in interest rate spreads. The results are also significant in light
of the confidence interval, at 5% level of significance.
Likewise, we ran the same correlation analysis for Malaysia and Indonesia. In the case
of Malaysia, the correlation coefficients are also supportive of the predictions of the
Pavlov–Wachter model. The confidence intervals for both sets of correlation coefficients
also indicate that the results are significant.
For Indonesia, the correlation coefficient between the real estate price index and the
interest rate differential is negative, in line with the prediction of the Pavlov–Wachter
W.T.H. Koh et al. / Journal of Asian Economics 15 (2005) 1103–11181112
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Fig. 2. Property price index and interest rate spread: (A) Thailand, (B) Singapore, (C) Malaysia, (D) Indonesia,
and (E) Hong Kong.
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Fig. 2. (Continued )
model. However, the correlation coefficient between the real estate price index and the
deposit rates is also negative. While the negative correlation result is not consistent with the
Pavlov–Wachter model prediction, it may not be significant, in light of the confidence
interval of (84.63, 4.01). One possible explanation for a negative correlation that we find
between deposit rates and real estate prices may be the fact that Indonesia saw very strong
W.T.H. Koh et al. / Journal of Asian Economics 15 (2005) 1103–1118 1115
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Table 2
Correlation analysis of real estate price indices and interest rates
Correlation coefficient and its confidence interval (%)a
Spread of lending rates
over deposit rates
Deposit rates
(3-month rate at commercial banks)
Model prediction of
Pavlov and Wachter (2004)
Negative Positive
Thailand (level monthly, from
January 1992 to May 2003)
89.37 (96.94, 81.80) 50.97 (43.40, 58.54)
Malaysia (level, monthly, from
December 1992 to May 2003)
64.75 (78.16, 51.33) 34.66 (18.15, 51.17)
Indonesia (level, monthly from
December 1995 to December 2000)
40.33 (80.64, 0.02) 44.32 (84.63, 4.01)
Singapore (level, quarterly,
from 1990Q1 to 1997Q4)
21.93 (56.84, 12.98) 26.79 (61.26, 7.69)
Hong Kong (level, quarterly,
from 1990Q1 to1997Q4)
3.99 (30.62, 38.61) 30.46 (63.47, 2.537)
a The numbers in parenthesis denote the confidence interval for the correlation coefficient, at 5% level of
significance.
inflows of foreign capital in the 1990s, so that deposit rates continue to fall in the wake of
the inflow.
Finally, we carry out the correlation analysis for Singapore and Hong Kong as well.12 In
both cases, the signs of the correlation coefficients were opposite to those that were
predicted by the Pavlov–Wachter model, as well as noticeably smaller in absolute values.
The confidence intervals for the correlation coefficients indicate that these contrary results
are significant, except for the correlation between Hong Kong real estate prices and deposit
rate. In this case, the confidence interval of (63.99, 3.06) implies that the negative
correlation between real estate price and deposit rate may not be as significant as the other
correlation results. Nonetheless, taken together, these results suggest that the Pavlov–
Wachter underpricing phenomenon was likely not present in Singapore and Hong Kong.
In Singapore’s case, the government exercised tight control over land sales and such
sales were accelerated in the 1990s to dampen the property market as real estate prices rose.
At the same time, guidelines for real estate loans were tightened in 1996 to curb speculation
in property. Among the measures introduced was to treat capital gains of real estate
transactions as taxable income if the sale of the property took place within 3 years of
purchase. The maximum loan quantum was also fixed at 80% of the appraised real estate
value. Together with tighter guidelines on bank loans to the real estate sector, Singapore
banks were less exposed to the real estate market than other countries, such as Indonesia
and Thailand. The Monetary Authority of Singapore (the de facto central bank) targets
exchange rate bands, which then makes money supply and interest rate endogenous.
Intervention to prevent undue exchange rate appreciation would increase money supply
and lower domestic interest rates. There is a bias towards such intervention in order to
protect export competitiveness. Although the resultant lower domestic interest rate would
be a spur to asset inflation, the guidelines on real estate loans noted earlier would provide
some dampener.
In the case of Hong Kong, the currency was pegged to the U.S. dollar at HK$7.8 to one
U.S. dollar. This meant that the Hong Kong interest rates moved in line with the U.S.
interest rates. This may have prevented banks from underpricing and led to a financially
sound lending sector.
5. Discussion and conclusion
The Pavlov and Wachter (2004) model shows that the incentives to underprice the put
option of non-recourse loans results in inflated asset prices above their fundamental level.
Our analysis shows that Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia appeared to have experienced
the Pavlov–Wachter underpricing phenomena, which, in turn, resulted in massive price
declines following the negative demand shock of 1997. Singapore and Hong Kong, on the
other hand, seem to have successfully controlled underpricing in the early 1990s, due to
strong and decisive government intervention. Consistent with this model, Singapore and
W.T.H. Koh et al. / Journal of Asian Economics 15 (2005) 1103–11181116
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Authority of Singapore).
Hong Kong experienced relatively smaller price declines. Relative to their peaks, the real
estate markets in Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia declined by shocking 95, 86, and 81
percentage points, respectively, while Singapore and Hong Kong saw relatively more
moderate declines of 33 and 38 percentage points.
The analysis of the underpricing equilibrium in the paper supports the view that the
presence of incentives to underprice real estate loans was prevalent during the Asian real
estate bubble, and is a factor in fuelling the asset bubble in the run-up to the Asian financial
crisis. These results complement the findings of other research on the factors that fuelled
the asset bubbles in the run-up to the Asian financial crisis.
Data limitations prevent us from conducting a more detailed analysis at present, and
further research is needed to refine the results. With more comprehensive real estate data,
we could also control for other variables to refine the analysis. For instance, we could
control for the difference in the exchange rate regimes as well as the control over domestic
interest rate by the central banks. As we noted earlier, since foreign capital inflow was a
significant driver of the stock market boom and real estate market boom, deposit rates may
not need to rise, even as banks continue to increase their lending to the real estate sector.
Finally, we note that the system of pegged exchange rates present in many Asian
countries in the early 1990s also meant that besides loan default risk, exchange rate risk
(specifically, devaluation risk) could be another significant factor in the underpricing of the
embedded put options in the loans market. Incorporating these aspects into an expanded
theoretical model described in Pavlov and Wachter (2004) will enrich the analysis and
could yield additional predictions that we can test empirically.
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